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THE TWELVE BEST REASONS FOR COMMODITY PROGRAMS: 
WHY NONE STANDS SCRUTINY 
by 
Luther Tweeten • 
The thesis of this paper is that the traditional 
justifications for farm commodity programs no 
longer stand scrutiny. Programs either fail to meet 
needs of agriculture and society or meet them cost-
ineffectively. Programs are an anachronism of the 
1930s and need to be phased out. I have elsewhere 
proposed a 10-year phaseout minimizing pain to 
those made worse off by adjustments and 
restructuring of programs. 
This paper scrutinizes the following reasons for 
farm programs: (1) equity and fairness, (2) 
economic efficiency, (3) chronic low returns on 
resources, (4} food security, (5) risk, (6) 
countervailing foreign subsidies, (7) preserving 
family farms, (8) preserving rural communities, (9) 
protecting the environment, (10) maintaining a fair 
share offederal government benefits, (11) sustaining 
farmland values, and (12) "they work. • 
Justifying Programs 
I. Equity and fairness 
Measured by income and wealth, American 
farmers are no longer "have nots" : 
• Income per farm household equals or 
exceeds that per nonfarm household. Income parity 
is the culmination of long-term structural change to 
larger farms, more off-farm employment, and 
increased productivity. A phaseout of farm 
programs would be only a transitory setback in this 
trend. 
• Wealth of farmers (over $300,000 per 
household) averages several times that of consumers 
(less than $100,000 per household) and taxpayers 
(some $150,000 per household). Net worth of 
commercial farms, defmed as those with annual 
sales of over $100,000, averages nearly $1 million 
per farm and they receive 70% of commodity 
program payments. 
Monetary benefits of commodity programs have 
been capitalized into land values and show up in 
higher rent, thereby passing program benefits to 
landlords. I do not have wealth data on farm 
landlords, but on average they are probably more 
wealthy than operators. Based on ownership of 
farm real estate in 1992, 37% of commodity 
program benefits (over $5 billion annually) go to 
nonfarm landlords. 
Some contend that transfers to agriculture are 
justified to alleviate farm poverty. The poor do not 
survive long in commercial agriculture to which 
commodity programs are aimed. The poor mainly 
operate small farms or are hired farm workers who 
have few commodities to sell and little to gain from 
commodity programs. Human resource 
development programs are more effective means to 
alleviate poverty. 
The conclusion that farmers have achieved 
income/wealth parity with nonfarmers has profound 
policy implications. With farming no longer a 
welfare case, producers can afford to pay for means 
to cope with risk and other "unique" problems of 
agriculture. A government that pays risk insurance 
premiums for producers gets more of what it pays 
for (instability and farming of fragile, erosion-prone 
marginal lands) and less of what the public wants 
(stability and environmental protection). 
However, farmers should not necessarily pay for 
what the public wants from agriculture that the 
market will not provide. Possible candidates are 
food security, family farm preservation, and 
"downstream" environmental protection discussed 
later. 
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2. Economic efficiency 
Some contend that our agriculture is efficient 
because commodity programs raise productivity. 
Our consumers spend a smaller share of their 
mcome on food than do consumers in any other 
nation, and that low ratio has been achieved during 
the six decades under commodity programs. The 
gains were made because of rising farming 
productivity and rising consumer real income and 
not because of commodity programs. 
Evidence that commodity programs retarded 
rather than advanced efficiency and productivity is 
compelling: 
• Removing a valuable resource, land, from 
production reduces productivity and international 
competitiveness. 
• Empirical evidence reveals that productivity 
gains in agriculture are the product of public and 
private investments in research, education, 
extension, and infrastructure rather than of 
commodity programs. 
• Commodity programs typically reduce the 
nation's net income by $5 billion annually due to 
resources used unproductively for political lobbying, 
program administration, cropland set asides, and 
other market interventions. Because producers gain 
$5 billion less than consumers and taxpayers lose, 
the nation's income and federal budget deficit would 
improve by phasing out commodity programs. 
Returning idled acres to production would 
initially expand food output and reduce food prices. 
With time, some food prices would rise to provide 
production incentives previously provided by 
government programs. Total consumer food 
expenses would not change much because lower 
prices for sugar and peanuts would offset any higher 
prices for grains. However, the overall cost of food 
and fiber (including taxpayer outlays for farm 
programs) would drop at least $10 billion annually. 
• Grains, peanuts, sugar, fiber, and dairy 
commodities are not public goods such as national 
defense warranting government interventions for 
market efficiency. Farm commodities are market 
goods because they possess characteristics (rival, 
exclusionary, transparent) required for markets to 
work well. 
The half of U.S. agriculture that does not 
receive support is at least as efficient as the half 
covered by programs. American farm commodity 
markets work. One reason is because they are 
supported by strong science and efficient 
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agribusiness. However, interventions in agriculture 
sometimes are warranted to provide public goods 
such as basic research, educatiOn, and infrastructure. 
3. Farm resources are predestined to earn low 
returns in the absence of commodity programs 
This argument for continuing farm programs 
takes many forms. One is that farmers are unique: 
They are price takers, unlike other sectors that are 
price makers able to control their economic destiny. 
Another assertion is that a competitive farming 
sector sandwiched between a "monopolistic" input 
supply sector and a "monopsonistic" marketing 
sector can never earn a fair return on resources. 
Farmers, it is said, are exploited by an agribusiness 
sector reaping profits that should go to farmers. 
These and related conjectures are myth: 
• Most Americans are price takers. Even 
General Motors and IBM are price takers, unable 
to arbitrarily raise their prices without sacrificing 
profits. 
• The American agribusiness sector has an 
exemplary record of high performance. American 
farm products are delivered abroad, for example, 
for less cost per ton mile than products of any other 
nation. 
• Farmers are served by an extensive system of 
agribusiness cooperatives that serve as a yardstick 
and alternative source of inputs and markets to 
private agribusiness. 
• Even if input supply and product marketing 
firms were imperfectly competitive and earning high 
profits, the farming sector would not earn low 
returns if resources are mobile. And farming 
resources such as labor now are mobile. 
• Most importantly, resources on reasonably 
well managed commercial farms do not earn low 
returns. On average, assets on such farms earn 
returns of 10% and more on investment -
comparable to like resources elsewhere in the 
economy. That outcome is precisely what one 
would expect from equilibrium in an efficient 
market. 
The author of a recent newspaper article justify 
farm commodity programs because " new 
[farming] technology results in lower consumer 
prices instead of higher producer profits as in other 
industries" apparently was unaware that commercial 
farms on average make normal profits despite rapid 
productivity gains. Real income per capita of farm 
people increased more than 10-fold since 1930, a 
period ofunprecedented technological progress (see 
references at end of paper). 
The current rate of return on farm assets has 
averaged about 4% for several decades, well below 
typical returns elsewhere in the economy. For 
various reasons, aggregate farm rates of return 
appear to be low when they are not and appear to 
provide evidence of resource disequilibrium when 
they do not. One reason is because published rates 
of return combine well-managed commercial farms 
earning returns comparable to those elsewhere with 
small and poorly managed farms earning low and 
even negative rates. For many small farms, 
amemtles of rural living, tax advantages, and 
prospects for capital gains offset low monetary 
returns. That is, monetary plus nonmonetary 
returns on small farms are favorable enough so that 
owners keep their resources in farming. 
Another reason farm aggregate average rates of 
return appear to be low when they are not is 
because returns come in two forms: current return 
and capital gain. Current returns on farm assets 
average about 4% per year as indicated above. 
Capital gains traditionally have kept pace with and 
compensated for inflation in farming so that the 
current return is also the real return. Many farmers 
and others are willing to commit their resources to 
agriculture for a real, inflation-compensated return 
of 4%. And, as indicated earlier, returns on the 
well-managed commercial farms that set land prices 
average double that rate. 
The price system will not provide parity returns 
on small, poorly managed farms any more than it 
will on small, poorly managed nonfarm businesses. 
Unless commodity programs are carefully targeted, 
they also will not provide uneconomic size farms 
with a "fair"return. Direct payments targeting such 
farms may appear to be an attractive alternative to 
current programs, but have drawbacks. One is that 
attempts to target have failed in the past and will be 
prone to fail again. Another is that the public is 
wary of subsidizing inefficiency. 
4. Food security for the U.S. 
The preamble to the 1990 farm bill says its 
purpose is "to ensure consumers an abundant supply 
of food and fiber at reasonable prices." For several 
reasons, food supplies would not be threatened by 
terminating commodity programs: 
• Food security is amply provided by the large 
buffer this nation enjoys from a productive 
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agriculture, food export surpluses, ability to feed 
less and slaughter more livestock, and a strong 
private sector that would provide buffer stocks and 
other food security functions if the government did 
not crowd it out. If intervention is deemed 
necessary, a simple and relatively unobtrusive means 
would be to expand the 4 million ton emergency 
wheat reserve to be used in times of special need as 
judged by the President. 
• The half of crops and livestock not covered 
by commodity programs are provided in abundance 
and with favorable returns on resources. If 
government interventions were terminated, after an 
adjustment period the performance for covered 
commodities would be as favorable. Consumers do 
not anguish over shortages of tomatoes, potatoes, 
eggs, broilers, and other commodities not under 
government control. However, programs indirectly 
affect such noncovered commodities, for example, 
by raising costs of feeding animals. 
• Tobacco and cotton programs can hardly be 
justified on food security grounds. 
• American consumers spend only 2.5% of 
their income for farm food ingredients. Even the 
unprecedented 42% farm price jump in 1972-73, if 
repeated today, would add only 1 percentage point 
to the share of income consumers spend on food. 
Studies of risk preferences reveal that most 
consumers prefer the market-oriented policy of low 
food prices most of the time (but an occasional food 
price spike) to high food prices all the time with 
price supports. 
• Central planning in the U.S. and elsewhere 
has had a disappointing record of managing food 
supplies. Excessive government stocks depressing 
farm prices in the 1950s and 1960s, and excessive 
acreage withdrawal in 1983 are examples of failures 
of central planning. A global movement is 
underway toward greater reliance on markets. 
• A shift away from acreage reduction 
programs (ARPs) and towards direct payments 
(marketing loans and deficiency payments) has 
reduced government buffer stocks. Meanwhile, the 
continued government presence in agriculture 
discourages private buffer stocks and forward 
markets that enhance food security. Thus 
commodity programs no longer provide buffer 
reserves they once did, and may increase food 
insecurity by driving out private holders of buffer 
stocks. If the government maintains its presence in 
farming but no longer idles cropland nor holds 
buffer stocks, its contribution to food security will 
be negligible and perhaps negative. 
5. High risk 
Risk is the premier economic problem faced by 
commercial agriculture, but the presence of risk 
does not justify commodity programs: 
• Risk is not a prima facia case for subsidies -
Las Vegas and lotto gamblers along with Wall 
Street and futures market speculators are more 
often taxed than subsidized. 
• Risk is a serious irritant but not business-life 
threatening for most farm producers. Many 
successfully pursue strategies of diversification (e.g., 
off-farm earnings), flexibility, liquidity, forward 
marketing, private insurance, and the like with 
success. 
• When operators choose to farm, they surely 
are aware of the risks endemic to the industry. 
• Risk shifting measures such as vertical 
coordination have been successfully implemented 
especially among farm commodities not covered by 
government supports. 
• New instruments such as state crop yield 
futures contracts and cooperatives to pool risks of 
small producers would bloom in the absence of 
government commodity programs. 
• Government programs have discouraged 
innovation of private risk shifting instruments and 
their use by producers. Research at Ohio State 
University and elsewhere indicates that the private 
trade would hold socially optimal buffer stocks in 
the absence of government commodity programs. 1 
• Risk is not unique to fanning. Other major 
elements of the economy also face severe risk, and, 
in fact, small businesses have higher failure rates 
than farms. Yet, despite or because of minimal 
government intervention, small nonfarm business 
has been a vital, dynamic, and growing sector. 
• Government risk management often fails. 
Provision of disaster payments and federal all-risk 
crop insurance has been an administrative 
nightmare and subject of abuse by farmers. 
Reports are too common of disaster payments for 
more acres of a crop in a county than were ever 
harvested even in good years. Few farmers 
voluntarily buy federal crop insurance despite heavy 
subsidies. Nowhere in the world are farmers 
sufficiently risk averse to pay the full cost of all-risk 
crop insurance. Government payment of insurance 
premiums encourages fanners to raise output 
variation to maximize subsidies and encourages 
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cropping in marginal farming areas with fragile soils 
that in many cases should be in grass or trees. 
Partly to reduce risk in the dairy industry. the 
government has fostered a complex marketing order 
system with multiple prices featuring a higher fluid 
milk consumption price and a lower manufactured 
milk price. The multiple-price system "taxes" fluid 
milk consumers. The resulting blend price paid to 
producers induces more supply than the market will 
absorb. Surpluses generated by this system and by 
government price support have been removed from 
markets by the Commodity Credit Corporation. 
The program has been justified by the need to 
maintain orderly markets and assure adequate 
seasonal and annual milk supplies by region. Large 
administrative, lobbying, and resource misallocation 
costs have been incurred. 
Is the program necessary to reduce risk, provide 
food security, and provide bargaining power to 
producers? Modern storage, handling, 
transportation, and communication technology now 
permits milk to be stored for long periods and 
transported long distances at low costs that will 
avoid seasonal and area shortages of dairy products. 
Large producer cooperatives give dairy producers 
bargaining power when facing processing and 
distribution firms. Thus modem technology and 
market relationships can provide an orderly market 
and adequate dairy supplies with deregulation, 
thereby saving taxpayers, consumers, and 
agribusiness billions of dollars. 
6. Countervailing foreign subsidies 
This justification for programs is stated as "We 
must subsidize if other countries subsidize" or "We 
can compete with foreign producers but not with 
foreign governments." 
Such statements do not stand scrutiny: 
• Other countries including New Zealand, 
Canada, Australia, and the European Union (EU) 
are cutting back agricultural subsidies unilaterally. 
• The completed Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations requires countries to 
cut their agricultural export quantity subsidized by 
21% and export subsidy value by 36% by year 2000. 
Our Export Enhancement Program of subsidies may 
have helped us to get a better deal out of the 
Uruguay Round but future U.S.export subsidies are 
unlikely to influence EU behavior, the chief villain 
in subsidized trade. Meanwhile, continued U.S. 
export subsidies alienate our friends such as Canada 
and Australia as we take over markets because they 
cannot afford to match our subsidies. 
• Studies summarized by the General 
Accounting Office indicate that the Export 
Enhancement Program had a low payoff even 
before completion of the Uruguay Round. It is less 
cost-effective than direct payments in raising farm 
mcome. It raises domestic prices relative to world 
prices, inviting imports of durum wheat from 
Canada. 
• Importers such as the Fonner Soviet Union 
gain from our food export subsidies while our 
nation (especially taxpayers) loses. 
• Continuing farm subsidies detract from 
fundmg of high-payoff agricultural research for 
agricultural productivity gains that are the core of 
our international competitiveness. 
• International trade models indicate that 
consumers, agribusiness firms, and taxpayers gain 
more than producers lose from terminating trade 
distortions. Models of the economy typically show 
U.S. national income losses of $4 billion or more 
annually from trade distortions induced by 
commodity programs. These results show as large 
or larger gains in national income from unilateral 
than from multilateral liberalization. The fact that 
the U.S. , EU, and other major traders liberalized 
their policies before rather than after the Uruguay 
Round agreement strongly suggests each country 
gained from opening markets whether or not other 
countries opened their markets. However, because 
multilateral liberalization lifts world prices, 
producers are better off from multilateral 
liberalization than from unilateral liberalization. 
• American production of peanuts, tobacco, 
sugar, cotton, and rice faces competition mainly 
from countries too poor to provide effective 
subsidies or government competition warranting 
countenneasures by the U.S. Most would end their 
subsidies if we would end our subsidies. 
7. Preserve the family farm 
Commodity programs have not saved the family 
farm. Empirical models provide some insights: 
• According to my empirical analysis, 
commodity programs have no major impact on farm 
size and number, but may modestly increase size 
and decrease numbers in the long tenn. Programs 
provide security and capital, encouraging farmers to 
leverage equity to buy and consolidate a neighboring 
farm and purchase additional machinery to cut labor 
needs and expand operations. 
• Tennination of programs "overnight" could 
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drop land values by $100 billion and cause many 
financially vulnerable family farms to fail. A 10-
year transitton program can minimize adjustment 
difficulties. 
• In the 1980s, the rate of decline in farm 
numbers was twice as fast in Japan as in the U.S. 
Yet, Japan was supporting prices at four times U.S. 
price levels. The European Union with very high 
supports also has had a higher rate of farm 
outmovement than the U.S. in recent decades. The 
major reason for the slower U.S. rate was because 
we made our adjustment earlier - in the 1950s and 
1960s. Commodity programs could do more to 
preserve farms of choice but a major restructuring 
would be required to target small and mid-size 
family farms. 
• Farm size and numbers are determined 
primarily by technology. Commodity programs can 
temporarily run against the tide but eventually 
markets and technology prevail. 
• Any farm people displaced by ending 
commodity programs are not necessarily worse off. 
An Oklahoma study of fonner farm operators who 
exited in mid-career found that the number who 
said they were better off outnumbered those who 
said they were worse by a four to one ratio. 
8. Preserve rural communities 
After experiencing net inmigration in the 1970s 
and net outmigration in the 1980s, rural areas have 
again returned to net inmigration in the 1990s. 
Many feel that generous commodity programs are 
a useful way to further stimulate the rural economy. 
Several considerations argue against that conclusion: 
• Fewer than one-third of the nation's some 
2,400 rural counties are farm-dependent, that is, 
receiving over 20% of their income from farm 
related earnings. These counties contain only 7% of 
the nation's population. Most of these counties are 
in the Great Plains. The economic base of most 
rural communities is service industries and 
manufacturing rather than farming. 
• Less than 10% of the 60 million rural 
residents live on farms. Only one-third of farm 
households are full time farmers, and fully 87% of 
farm household income came from off-farm sources 
in 1993. Thus farming is the direct economic base 
for less than 5% of rural workers (full-time 
equivalent) and for less than 10% if multipliers are 
considered for local nonfarm jobs created by farm 
jobs. 
• Farm dependent rural communities are more 
affluent than rural communities dependent on other 
occupations. And my research with David 
Henderson indicates that increasing farm income 
can hasten the shift of shopping from nearby small 
towns to more distant urban areas offering more 
variety at lower prices. 
• Other, more cost-effective state and federal 
strategies such as investment in more hours of 
schooling per day and per year will serve the people 
in rural communities better than will commodity 
programs. 
In summary, neither efficiency, equity, nor cost-
effectiveness argue that commodity programs are a 
wise route to rural development. 
9. Protect the environment 
Although the market alone will not protect the 
environment, current commodity programs are an 
inadequate delivery system for several reasons: 
• Conservation Compliance (CC) is a success 
story but omits half of all cropland - that on farms 
not participating in government crop programs. 
Surveys indicate that CC is generally well received 
by producers, but cannot be comprehensive if tied 
to commodity programs. 
• Commodity programs discourage rotations 
and encourage excessive application of pesticides 
and synthetic fertilizers per acre on crops. 
• The Conservation Reserve Program is not 
cost-effective to protect the environment. Many 
acres in it have no environmental hazards. Much 
land classified as "highly erodible" can be fanned 
with modem conservation tillage and other "best 
practices" without harm to the environment. I have 
proposed a 20-year or permanent Cropland 
Easement Program (CEP) to remove approximately 
20 million acres of cropland from production that 
cannot be fanned with conservation _tillage at 
acceptable erosion rates or that poses water quality 
problems. The CEP would allow haying, grazing, 
forest, wildlife, or recreation use. 
Conservation Compliance (CC) needs to cover 
all cropland having environmental hazards. Some 
current commodity program funds would be 
reallocated to pay for environmental structures such 
as fences protecting grass filter strips. The public is 
not necessarily obligated to compensate fanners for 
extending Conservation Compliance because (1) 
modem conservation tillage practices now permit 
CC with no loss of profit or output on most land, 
(2) producers in most instances are being asked 
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only to do what is in their interest (e.g., saving soil) 
or to stop "downstream" damage they were causing 
other farmers or nonfanners, (3) costs to individual 
producers of CC are very difficult to estimate and 
hence to compensate, and ( 4) a Conservation 
Easement or Conservation Reserve Program needs 
to attend CC removing cropland from production 
that cannot be cropped at acceptable soil erosion 
tolerance or water quality levels using best practices. 
The Cropland Easement Program would 
compensate farmers and avoid "taking." 
10. Maintain a fair share of government benefits 
for farmers 
Those who contend that commodity programs 
are justified to ensure that fanners receive a fair 
share of federal benefits emphasize the declining 
farm portion of the federal budget. That share has 
fallen from 4% in 1950 to 1% in recent years. In 
contrast, farming accounts for nearly 2% of the 
nation's population and gross domestic product 
(GDP). 
Several considerations argue against the 
principle that fanners should receive the same share 
of the federal budget as their share of population 
and GDP: 
• The vast majority of federal spending is for 
services rendered such as defense and interest on 
the debt, or for insurance such as social security and 
medical care. These alone constitute two-thirds of 
federal outlays. Most other outlays are not 
subsidies to specific sectors. If we consider only 
federal budget subsidies to industries and arbitrarily 
allocate 2% of that to agriculture, the industry will 
receive far less than the annual $10-$15 billion for 
farm subsidies received in recent years. 
• The proper way to cut the federal budget is 
to prune spending that is inequitable, inefficient, 
and not effective in addressing the nation's needs. 
In contrast, spending that has a high payoff in 
meeting the nation's needs that the private sector 
will not supply warrants expansion even as overall 
spending is cut. By that standard, commodity 
programs need to be pruned while basic research to 
raise food resource productivity needs to be 
expanded. Statements such as "agriculture will 
accept cuts proportional to those in the rest of the 
budget," or "agriculture has already taken its share 
of cuts" may be good politics but are not sound 
economics. 
11. Sustain farmland values 
Expectations of continuing farm commodity 
programs have caused some $100 billion of such 
benefits to be capitalized into land prices, or up to 
15% of total farmland value.2 The percentages are 
hiaher in cotton, rice, and wheat areas where 
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benefits have been especially generous. 
Maintaining these capitalized benefits is not a 
case for continuing farm programs for several 
reasons: 
• Preserving programs without merit just to 
avoid capital losses makes no more sense than 
maintaining unneeded military bases and personnel 
to avoid adjustments. 
• Commodity programs are of little value to 
new owners, renters, operators, and farm laborers. 
Benefits have gone mainly to those who owned land 
when programs were initiated. However, 
termination of programs will be painful to the new 
owner-operators because they will experience 
decapitalization of real estate assets. The impact is 
dampened somewhat because many land market 
participants anticipated that programs could not be 
sustained and restrained their land bids accordingly 
in recent years. 
• Adjustments to the market need not be 
traumatic. Program support parameters have been 
reduced 50% since 1985 but real income per capita 
on farms has risen. Phasing programs out over 10 
years as I propose would mean loss of land assets of 
about 1.5% annually for 10 years, other things 
equal. Over the long term, land prices have kept 
pace with inflation and are expected to do so in the 
future, ceteris paribus. If inflation averages 4% 
annually over the next decade, land prices may rise 
only 4 - 1.5 = 2.5% per year with program 
phaseout, a disappointing but not devastating 
adjustment compared to the 6% average annual 
drop between 1982 and 1987. 
12. Commodity programs work 
Politicians and commodity groups frequently 
defend programs by saying "they work." The 
meaning of "they work" is unclear but probably 
means programs meet the needs of their advocates. 
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• Failure of the previous 11 justifications to 
stand critical scrutiny is evidence programs do not 
work to meet the needs of the public at large. 
• Even the egregiously worst agricultural 
policies the world over have avid defenders. That 
is because someone gains from policies that fail the 
most elementary tests of equity and efficiency. The 
programs work to serve special interests but not the 
public interest. 
Conclusions 
Commodity programs have lost their economic, 
social, and environmental rationale and now must 
rely for sustenance on political power. The nation 
can no longer afford upper middle class welfare, -
70% of programs benefits go directly to commercial 
farmers (sales over $100,000 per year) who on 
average are millionaires. Land owners are the 
ultimate beneficiaries ofprograms and these owners 
on average may be more wealthy than operators, 
and many are not farmers. 
To avoid severe adjustment strains, programs 
need to be gradually phased out over a 1 0-year 
period. Announcing the phaseout in advance alerts 
investors to stop capitalizing benefits into land and 
to begin adjustment to a market economy. The 
government could afford to be generous in 
providing training, job information, relocation 
assistance, counseling, and the like for any who 
leave farming rather than continue the far more 
costly commodity programs to maintain land price. 
The case for ending "no federal cost" programs 
for sugar, tobacco, peanuts, and marketing orders 
for milk are at least as strong as for ending grain 
and cotton programs. "No federal cost" programs 
"taxing" consumers are more regressive than 
programs taxing taxpayers. That is because 
taxpayers on average are more wealthy than 
consumers. Also, programs providing decoupled 
deficiency payments from taxpayers distort markets 
and reduce national income less than programs 
distorting markets with mandated high prices. 
Endnotes 
1. Based on econometric models, sizable changes in interest costs to reflect high risk premiums demanded by 
pnvate versus public buffer stock holders produced very modest changes in the coefficients of variation in food 
grain prices and consumption. 
2. Various combinations of investors' discount rates, expected annual benefit, and duration of commodity 
programs can give $100 billion capitalization. Examples are expected benefits of $20 billion per year discounted 
at 15% for 10 years; or expected benefits of $10 billion per year for 15 years discounted at 5%. 
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